Obama Avoids Japanese A-Bomb Question

This past Friday, News Busters pointed out that the POTUS punted on a question regarding the use of the Atomic Bomb to end WWII.  Here are the comments of the POTUS, courtesy of News Busters.

JAPANESE REPORTER: What is your understanding of the historical meaning of the A-bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki?  Do you think it was the right decision?

Obama took a deep breath, paused . . . and punted.

PBO gave a halting response that utterly failed to answer the question.  The closest he came was to observe that Japan “has a unique perspective on the issue of nuclear weapons as a consequence of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and I’m sure it helps to motivate the Prime Minister’s deep interest in this issue.”

The reporter tried again: “do you believe the US dropping of nuclear weapons on –”

Obama cut him off, choosing to answer an unrelated question on the situation in North Korea.

This issue is one that the left brings up on occasion.  The basic point of the left was that the bombings were unnecessary, and that it was done to scare the Soviet Union.  However, our plans for the invasion on Japan, called Operation Downfall, have been de-classified for some time, and provide a great counterpoint to the left.  The following quotes are from a variety of sources.

Operation Downfall had two parts: Operation Olympic and Operation Coronet. Set to begin in October 1945, Operation Olympic was intended to capture the southern third of the southernmost main Japanese island, Ky?sh?, with the recently captured island of Okinawa to be used as a staging area.

Later, in spring 1946, Operation Coronet was the planned invasion of the Kant? plain, near Tokyo, on the Japanese island of Honsh?. Airbases on Ky?sh? captured in Operation Olympic would allow land-based air support for Operation Coronet.

Japan’s geography made this invasion plan obvious to the Japanese as well; they were able to predict accurately the Allied invasion plans and accordingly adjust their defensive plan, Operation Ketsug?. The Japanese planned an all-out defense of Ky?sh?, with little left in reserve for any subsequent defense operations.

Casualty predictions varied widely but were extremely high for both sides: depending on the degree to which Japanese civilians resisted the invasion, estimates ran into the millions for Allied casualties[1] and tens of millions for Japanese casualties.

Source: Wikipedia (I cross referenced this for accuracy)

So, the invasions would be predictable, considering the few beaches useful for amphibious landing.  This would enable to Japanese to concentrate their remaining forces near those areas, and dig in, which they did.

There were two naval groups.

The Strike Force, 3rd Fleet, had 21 carriers and 10 fast battleships to range up and down the length of Japan to suppress Japanese forces with priority to destroy aircraft and transportation.

The Assault Force, 5th Fleet, had 26 carriers, plus 8 detached from Strike force for the invasion period, 13 slow battleships, 20 cruisers, 139 DD, 167 DE, and support ships for a total of 800 warships. Troops and their equipment were to come from the Philippines and Marianas in 1,500 transports. All combat troops were from the Pacific theater ; none redeployed from Europe. The plan called for a diversionary display by the floating reserve on Shikoku, the smallest of Japan’s four islands, before their landing on Kyushu. Support troops including engineers to build airfields were to land starting on Y-Day + 2 ; some of these were to come from Europe.

Source:  WW2 Pacific

Notice the size of the forces, 47 Aircraft carriers, and 23 battleships.  Note that these ships routinely have crews over 1200 sailors.  This is easily the largest Naval armada ever assembled.  But what the Japanese have to counter them?

Operation Ketsug?

Kamikaze

The Japanese defense relied heavily on kamikaze planes. In addition to fighters and bombers, they reassigned almost all of their trainers for the mission, trying to make up in quantity what they lacked in quality. Their army and navy had more than 10,000 aircraft ready for use in July (and would have had somewhat more by October) and were planning to use almost all that could reach the invasion fleets. Ugaki also oversaw building of hundreds of small suicide boats that would also be used to attack any Allied ships that came near the shores of Ky?sh?.

Fewer than 2,000 kamikaze planes launched attacks during the Battle of Okinawa, achieving approximately one hit per nine attacks. At Ky?sh?, given the more favorable circumstances (such as terrain that reduced the U.S’s radar advantage), they hoped to get one for six by overwhelming the U.S. defenses with large numbers of kamikaze attacks in a period of hours. The Japanese estimated that the planes would sink more than 400 ships; since they were training the pilots to target transports rather than carriers and destroyers, the casualties would be disproportionately greater than at Okinawa. One staff study estimated that the kamikazes could destroy a third to a half of the invasion force before its landings.[18]

Naval forces

By August 1945, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had ceased to be an effective fighting force. The only Japanese major warships in fighting order were six aircraft carriers, four cruisers, and one battleship, none of which could be adequately fueled. They could “sustain a force of twenty operational destroyers and perhaps forty submarines for a few days at sea.”[19]

The IJN also had about 100 K?ry?-class midget submarines, 250 smaller Kairy?-class midget submarines, 1,000 Kaiten manned torpedoes, and 800 Shin’y? suicide boats.

In March 1945, there was only one combat division in Ky?sh?. Over the next four months the Imperial Japanese Army transferred forces from Manchuria, Korea, and northern Japan, while raising other forces in place. By August, they had fourteen divisions and various smaller formations, including three tank brigades, for a total of 900,000 men.[20] Although the Japanese were able to raise large numbers of new soldiers, equipping them was more difficult. By August, the Japanese Army had the equivalent of 65 divisions in the homeland but only enough equipment for 40 and only enough ammunition for 30.[21]

The Japanese did not formally decide to stake everything on the outcome of the Battle of Ky?sh?, but they concentrated their assets to such a degree that there would be little left in reserve. By one estimate, the forces in Ky?sh? had 40% of all the ammunition in the Home Islands.[22]

In addition, the Japanese had organized the Patriotic Citizens Fighting Corps—which included all healthy men aged 15–60 and women 17–40—to perform combat support, and ultimately combat jobs. Weapons, training, and uniforms were generally lacking: some men were armed with nothing better than muzzle-loading muskets, longbows, or bamboo spears; nevertheless, they were expected to make do with what they had.[23]

One mobilized high school girl, Yukiko Kasai, found herself issued an awl and told, “Even killing one American soldier will do. … You must aim for the abdomen.”[24]

Source: Wikipedia

So, even though we would have had superior quality forces, the Japanese would rely on overwhelming those forces with sheer numbers.  By that point, our planes and pilots were better, and our radar was about the best in the world, but those forces could only defend against so much at one time.  It was that which the Japanese sought to exploit.  We had 1500 transports set for the invasion.  The Japanese counted on sinking 400.  These transport ships were unarmed, slow, and lightly skinned, and while they would be screened by the combat ships of the fleet, one hit would sink them, killing  or  injuring most of the troops on board.  That is what the Japanese wanted; take out as much of the invasion force before they could land.  They knew they were going to lose the war.  Their concentration of forces were meant to cause as many casualties as possible in the initial phases of the invasion, so the American people would demand that the government sue for peace.  This would leave the Japanese government with a means to save face and avoid the humiliation of surrender.

Another disturbing aspect of this plan was the preparation of the civilian population.  They did expect all citizens to fight in some way.  It is likely that many would have.  They would have caused casualties, but not anywhere near the number to end the war.  I would predict that the outcome of civilians fighting would be for the troops to distrust the populace, and probably not take much are to avoid civilian casualties.  In the end, that effort would cause even more death and destruction among the Japanese populace.

Different branches of the military did different studies that had varying estimates as to American casualties.  No matter which you take, the numbers are large, and tragic.  The left will say that the numbers were fudged, and were invented to justify using the bomb.  For them, I leave you with this.

Nearly 500,000 Purple Heart medals were manufactured in anticipation of the casualties resulting from the invasion of Japan. To the present date, all the American military casualties of the sixty years following the end of World War II—including the Korean and Vietnam Wars—have not exceeded that number. In 2003, there were still 120,000 of these Purple Heart medals in stock.[45] There are so many in surplus that combat units in Iraq and Afghanistan are able to keep Purple Hearts on-hand for immediate award to wounded soldiers on the field.[45]

The choice was clear then, and defending it should be clear now.  President Obama could have said this, “The bombing were necessary to bring the war to a quick conclusion.  President’s Truman’s decision saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans, and millions of Japanese.”